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Drivers of Urban Sprawl in Urbanizing China –
A Political Ecology Analysis
ABSTRACT:
Chinese cities have undergone a process of urbanization that has resulted in significant urban sprawl in
the past 20 years. This paper uses the 'ecology of actors' framework to analyze the interactions between
various state, market and civil society players that result in excessive land conversion from agricultural to
urban use. The paper shows that under the existing institutional setting, the interests of most actors
involved in the process are aligned towards greater land development and growth. The more land is
developed, the more land lease revenue for the local government, the more profit for developers, and the
more opportunities for compensation for farmers. Planning actors have been powerless to apply long term
planning principles. There is a need to change the underlying rules of the game so that environmental
impacts of land conversion are fully taken into account in the future economic calculations of actors
involved in the process.
Keyword: urban sprawl, Land conversion, political ecology, ecology of actors.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The term 'urban sprawl', loosely defined as dispersed, excessive and wasteful urban growth, has mostly
been used in the past to describe the US urban development phenomenon, characterized by the excessive
land use of suburban single-family housing development. The inefficiencies in North American cities are
mostly accounted for by excessive commuting and transportation costs, increased cost of infrastructure
and other public services, as well as the loss of natural open space associated with far-flung development
patterns 1. The causes and cures of urban sprawl in the US have been well debated2. The demand side
explanation focuses on lifestyle choices favoring single-family housing, automobile ownership and low-
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rise workplaces, while the supply side includes homeownership tax subsidies, and small and fragmented
local governments creating a steady demand for suburban and exurban living environments3.
The physical pattern of urban sprawl in Chinese cities appears quite different4. Schneider and Woodcock5
categorized Chinese cities as 'frantic-growth', featuring extremely rapid land conversion rates and a
tendency towards both dispersion and fragmentation, i.e. both continuous and leapfrog development
patterns. Although the national level urbanization policy - moving 250 million rural residents to cities by
20256, could partially justify the demand for land conversion, the speed of urban land growth exceeds
urban population growth. Urban populations have more than doubled during the last 30 years, while
urban land has more than tripled for all city sizes and locations7. Other than the negative impacts,
including in areas of transportation, infrastructure and natural environment, there are unique patterns of
inefficiency in China’s urban sprawl that calls for urgent policy interventions.
Patterns of inefficiency are evident in China’s version of urban sprawl, characterized by the widespread
irrational development. On one hand, land was converted from rural to urban use a long time ahead of
real demand: a large amount of rural land stays vacant for years after being acquired for development8.
This leads to loss of agricultural production during the time between land acquisition and actual
development. In cases where the farmers were forced to relocate without adequate compensation, such
land conversions have created social instability. Moreover, functional buildings have been demolished to
build new ones, and some new buildings stay vacant for years. The ‘China Housing Finance Survey’
revealed that the vacancy rate of sold residential homes in urban areas reached 22.4% in 2013, or 49
million homes, and that 3.5 million homes remained unsold9. In several cases, areas containing these
homes formed the Chinese version of 'ghost towns'10.
Various studies have proposed reasons for sprawl in China. Some criticize the state’s farmland protection
policy11; others blame it on local governments’ dependence on land sale revenue12 or real estate
3
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developers’ speculative behavior13; yet others explain it as the result of uncontrolled 'illegal' development
in rural areas without an official change in land use14. Each of these explanations, to some extent, are like
blind men touching different parts of the giant land conversion 'elephant' in China. This paper aims to
provide a fuller picture of the process, and shed light on the policy making processes.
In this paper, we use political ecology as an analytical lens through which to investigate the processes of
urban sprawl in China. Specifically, we map the ‘ecology of actors’ in the processes of urban sprawl and
use this as a framework to understand how these processes are shaped by the interaction among various
actors with different values, goals, policies and priorities. These actors are sometimes competing and at
other times cooperating with one another. Our discussion is mainly based on a review of the literature and
supplemented by anecdotal information from talking to local officials, developers and planners during my
two visits in 2013 and 2014. Following this introduction, we provide the analytical framework, and map
the ecology of actors in this situation. Then we describe in detail each actor. Finally, we discuss planners’
role in controlling urban growth, and point to the weaknesses in institutional settings that seems to have
led to urban sprawl.

II.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

China’s land conversion processes involve many players15– the government, developers, village leaders
and villagers – all of whom pursue their own interests based on existing institutions. This paper adopts the
approach taken by scholars in the political ecology tradition16 and considers the political economy of a
place, including as the idea of the 'growth machine'17, to review how these different players have
contributed to the urban sprawl in China. “Political ecology” theorizes environmental change as a
function of power relations18 , and provides the framework for a multi-scale analysis of environmental
degradation (land conversion in this case) from a political economy perspective. Although a relatively
new field that is still evolving with many unresolved debates, political ecology offers a multi-scalar
approach that allows us to examine urban development and its related policy formulation at the central
government level and, then, consider its implementation at provincial, municipal, and village levels19.
The power relations framework used in this paper is an adaptation of a similar framework proposed by
Nick Devas20 and used by Pal21 in a study of the metropolitan governance process in India. Figure 1 maps
12

See reference 8, (Deng & Huang, 2004); and Lichtenberg, E., & C. R. Ding. (2009). Local officials as land
developers: Urban spatial expansion in China. Journal of Urban Economics, 66(1), 57-64. doi:
10.1016/j.jue.2009.03.002;
13
Wang, L. G., H. Y. Han, & S. K. Lai. (2014). Do plans contain urban sprawl? A comparison of Beijing and
Taipei. Habitat International, 42, 121-130. doi: 10.1016/j.habitatint.2013.11.001
14
Huang, Yan. (2015). Beijing Revise its Master Plan in the next five year. Jan 24. Beijing Evening News. (in
Chinese). Retrieved on web May 12, 2015 from http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2015/01-24/7001753.shtml
15
Ma, Jianbo. (2009). An Institutional Analysis of the Chinese Land Conversion Process. Dissertation submitted to
the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park.
16
Evans, P. (2004). Development as institutional change: The pitfalls of monociropping and the potentials of
deliberation. Studies in Comparative International Development, 38(4), 30-52. doi: Doi 10.1007/Bf02686327.
17
Logan, John R., & Harvey Luskin Molotch. (1987). Urban fortunes : the political economy of place. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press..
18
Robbins, Paul. (2012). Political Ecology: a critical introduction (2nd ed.): Wiley-Blackwell..
19
Tilt, B. (2007). The political ecology of pollution enforcement in China: A case from Sichuan's rural industrial
sector. China Quarterly(192), 915-932. doi: Doi 10.1017/S0305741007002093.
20
Devas, Nick. (2004). Urban governance, voice, and poverty in the developing world. London ; Sterling, VA:
Earthscan Publications..

3

the actors and institutions, and their inter-relationships in China’s rural land conversion context. Three
sets of actors are involved - the state, market, and civil society. The state actors include national,
provincial and municipal/county (local) government officials. The market actors include real estate
developers and industrial land speculators. The civil society actors include both official village collectives
and other informal organizations of villagers.
THE STATE
State Council
National Development and Reform Commission
Ministry of Land
Resources

Ministry of Housing & Urban
Rural Development
Provincial governments
City governments

Public Private Partnership

Industrial entrepreneurs
Real-estate developers

Planning institutions

Village collectives

VillagerDeveloper
Coalition

THE MARKET

Ministry of ...

Villagers

CIVIL SOCIETY

Figure 1: The 'ecology of actors' involved in land conversion in China. (Adapted from Devas,
2004)
Globalization literature has argued that development goals are best achieved through a synergy of state,
market and civil society actors. Civil society actors in most countries include citizen interest groups,
political parties, religious groups, non-governmental and community-based organizations and the media.
In China there is hardly any presence of organized civil society actors independent of the state as this is
seen as a threat to the Communist Party and such groups are therefore either co-opted or persecuted. We
use the term civil society here to refer to formal village collectives with their elected village head,
individual villagers or urban residents or their loose associations in pursuit of a common purpose or
action.
Table 1 briefly introduces the interests that drive various actors and institutions during the processes of
land conversion.
Table 1: Land conversion actors and their driving interests.

State
actors
21

Actors

Driving interests

National Gov.

Move rural population to urban areas, promote economic growth;
Secure food supply - farmland protection policy;

Pal, A. (2006). Scope for bottom-up planning in Kolkata: rhetoric vs reality. Environment and Urbanization,
18(2), 501-521. doi: 10.1177/0956247806069628.
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Maintain social stability - minimize social conflict;
Compete (among ministries) for resource allocation;

Market
actors

Civil
society

III.

Local Gov.
(Provincial/Municipal/
city/county)

Promote economic growth - forming coalitions;
Provide local welfare - generate local public revenue;
Compete with other localities for promotion;

Industrial
entrepreneurs

Access cheap land and labor;
Hold cheap land and convert for commercial uses;

Real estate developers

Speculate in landholding and profitable development;
Form coalitions to access profitable land;

Village leaders

Maintain respect/authority among villagers - uphold egalitarian
principles;
Be accountable to township officials to ensure promotion potential;
Provide favors to relatives, voters and friends;

Villagers

Maximize compensation during land conversion;
Secure future livelihood.

THE STATE ACTORS

China’s governance structure can be characterized by economic decentralization and political
centralization22. Economic decentralization implies that local governments are directly responsible for and
deeply involved in developing the economies within their jurisdiction, and carry out most government
functions. Political centralization implies that the national government controls not only ideology and the
media, but also the personnel matters of local governments through its cadre evaluation system. The
central government directly appoints, evaluates and dismisses key provincial leaders and each tier of
government in turn appoints and evaluates lower-level government officials. Although city, provincial
and national governments are all state actors, they have different interests and motivations due to their
place in the hierarchy of government structure.
Since the economic reform in the late 1970s, China has seen unprecedented economic growth. In the
1990s, urbanization was adopted by the national government as a strategy for economic rebalancing - a
move to encourage domestic consumption in order to reduce reliance on export-led growth. In 1994, the
central government embarked on a program of fiscal centralization that left local governments with the
huge burden of providing public services and scant revenue sources to finance them23. Although in recent
years central government has been distributing more funds back to local governments, the situation did
not improve much at the local level after funds had been filtered through the hierarchy of intermediary
governments24. Given the scant sources from higher levels of government, land leasing fees became the
22
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main source of local revenue. China’s urban land is state owned and rural land is collectively owned by
the village residents. National government regulates land conversion and prohibits farmland from entering
the land market without first involving state expropriation. The idea of land value capture is consistent
with Henry George’s idea that land value increments created by regulatory changes, population growth,
and economic development should belong to the public25. The public land ownership in urban China
allows this expropriation to be implemented at a large scale in cities. Local governments are allowed to
acquire rural land from village residents on a compulsory basis, providing them with standard
compensation (normally several years of crop yields), and then to install infrastructure services and lease
the land to developers.
This system of decentralized responsibilities for public service provision within a system of centralized
fiscal authority provides local government officials with powerful incentives to acquire land and lease it
to developers. Land development and the related investments in infrastructure also boost local GDP, an
important performance indicator for local officials seeking promotion. This core dynamic could explain
much of the relationship among different levels of governments involved in land conversion in China. In
the following we separately explain the two major levels of government involved in the land conversion:
national and local government.

a National government
China’s national government regulates the permissible annual amount of new land that can be developed
each year. The National Guidelines for Comprehensive Land Use Planning (NGCLUP) allocates
buildable land quotas to provincial governments, based on provincial population size, level of economic
development, political importance, among other criteria. Provincial governments allocate these quotas on
to local governments. This land quota was in line with the Farmland Protection Policy in the 11th FiveYear Plan (2006-2010), aiming to ensure that the national farmland stock remained above 1.8 billion mu
(around 120 million hectares) by 2010. Since then the policy has turned its focus on designating
permanent farmland boundaries, and also urban growth boundaries for cities.
At national level, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Housing and
Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD), and Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), among 25 other
ministries, constitute the State Council headed by the Premier, which has direct influence and authority in
regulating land transfer. This authoritative national coordination tends to impose uniformities, while the
panoply of ministries remain heterogeneous in their orientations and often pursue contradictory goals26. It
is difficult for MLR to achieve its farmland protection target amid other ministries with differing, and at
times, conflicting development goals. For example, the Ministry of Transportation might want to build
roads, MOHURD wants to control housing prices, and they both want to take more farmland. No ministry
can afford to sacrifice its own political achievements for the sake of complying with the policies of other
ministries, since a minister’s performance is evaluated based on what he has achieved, not what he has
helped others to achieve27. China’s existing governmental structure has inherent weaknesses in horizontal
coordination.
In reality, MLR is competing rather than partnering with other ministries at all levels of government. The
vertical hierarchy within individual agencies encourages the leaders of an agency to compete with other
agencies, for more administrative authority. These benefits may sometimes be simply psychological,
25

George, Henry. (1879). Progress and poverty; an inquiry into the cause of industrial depressions, and of
increase of want with increase of wealth--The remedy (Author's ed.). San Francisco,: W. M. Hinton & co.,
printers..
26
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providing a sense of “being important”; but are often more tangible, taking the form of gifts, cash, or
personal favors28. At the national level, it is common for ministries to define programs that fall under their
administrative authority in terms that relate to urban development. For example, NDRC promoted the
'low-carbon city' program; MOHURD initiated the ‘eco-city’ program. More recently, the Ministry of
Culture has started to designate ‘eco-cultural protection zones’. The local level officials of these central
government ministries, therefore, gain influence over the design, siting and approval of certain
developments that fall under these categories. Some of these officials have been known to use this
influence to obtain tangible personal benefits for themselves. Competition within ministries is mirrored
also at local level in the forms of different local government agencies claiming rights over certain piece of
land, through their inclusion as part of the “low-carbon city” or “eco-city” program.

b Local (Provincial/Municipal/city/county) governments
Local governments have strong incentivizes to promote economic growth. They tend to use land leasing
for three interrelated reasons - to generate revenue to help meet their fiscal requirements at local level, to
promote GDP growth as a key component of their performance evaluation, and to compete with other
local governments for career advancement of key players in the city (mayors or party secretaries). The
connection between economic growth and land expansion is evident in China29: for every 3 per cent
expansion in urban land, the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) grows by 10 per cent.
The first challenge of the local government is to meet their public service responsibilities with their
limited revenue sources. The ‘land revenue regime’ allows local governments to gain revenue from land
and infrastructure development30. Many scholars31 have documented the propensity for local governments
to increase their fiscal earnings from land conversion, and have related this to their increased
responsibilities and reduced share of tax revenue from the national government since 1994. Zhang32
argued specifically that the main driving force of urban sprawl in China is local government's willingness
to lease out more land. This accounts for anywhere between 30 and 70% of a city’s revenue33.
Because of the financial pressure, local governments are willing to work around state level policies on
land protection. They usually respond with two strategies on land and infrastructure development:
increasing the amount of buildable land, and increasing the potential revenue generated from the land.
On one hand, local governments convert a lot more land than the buildable land quota they are allotted
from the upper level government. The national policy allows more buildable land if local government can
compensate with the ‘creation’ of new farmland, ensuring that the total amount of farmland in the region

28

See reference 15, (Ma, 2009).
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remains unchanged34. In practice, this kind of farmland reclamation 35 tends to ignore the location and
quality of new farmland created, and drives the loss of good quality farmland.
Pressured by their unfunded mandates, local governments also indulge in illegal conversions, or they
deliberately conceal or delay reporting of information to higher level governments. Ma summarized their
strategies as 'execute first and report later' and 'execute and do not report'36. Illegal land conversion
projects are relatively safe as long as nobody makes a fuss by reporting them formally to higher-level
governments or the media. Even if they do attract attention, projects with strong backing from the upper
level government usually face much lower risks than those supported by lower level governments only.
Local governments also adopt regulations that allow for varied land leasing fees based on land use. Local
governments usually provide subsidized (or free) land to manufacturing sector investors37, or embrace
local state corporatism38 to attract investment in industrial uses which could contribute to longer term
GDP growth. At the same time, local governments aim to maximize their gain from real estate and
commercial land developers. Before the 2000s, developers usually obtained land through government ties.
In the increasingly formalized land market, especially in the coastal region, more transactions in recent
years happened through auctions39. There are two different forms of auction: listing auctions (the highest
bidder wins) and tender auctions (where governments choose the winner by using a non-price
mechanism)40. The non-price mechanism implies that decisions may be made based on other factors,
which gives room for collusion between local officials and developers and provide opportunities for
corruption.
Both of these land leasing strategies reflect the second challenge for local governments, the drive for
higher GDP growth. Fainstein41 argued that the failure of public land leasing in China is due to the
absence of a private land market as a reference: local government could ask for any price they want.
Public land leasing without proper oversight could open the door for government rent-seeking behavior or
malfeasance. Ye and Wu42 found that economically stronger cities with higher real estate investment more
aggressively pursued land acquisition, leading to worse urban sprawl in these larger cities. Population
density in China’s large cities is much lower compared to other large cities in the world43.
34

Long, H. L., Y. R. Li, Y. S. Liu, M. Woods, & J. Zou. (2012). Accelerated restructuring in rural China fueled by
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36
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10.1177/0042098009357961.
38
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41
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Value Capture and Land Policies. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
42
Ye, L., & A. M. Wu. (2014). Urbanization, Land Development, and Land Financing: Evidence from Chinese
Cities. Journal of Urban Affairs, 36, 354-368. doi: DOI 10.1111/juaf.12105
43
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Retrieved on web April 14, 2015, from http://www.economist.com/news/china/21640396-how-fix-chinese-citiesgreat-sprawl-china

8

The third challenge for local governments in China is competing in a politically centralized system, in
which competition rather than coordination is characteristic across all levels of government44. As we
illustrated earlier, authority over land is fragmented among different agencies and at different levels of the
government in complex and overlapping ways (Evans, 2004). Different interest groups are strongly
motivated to claim their authority over development projects, in order to grab a share from the proceeds.
The political centralized, top-down structure in China hides the fragmentation of the economically
motivated local states. The high concentration of manufacturing industries in the coastal region was the
result of competition among fragmented government agencies for industrial development45.
The issue is further complicated by China’s dual land ownership regime (urban land vs. rural land) and
dual land administration institutions (urban and rural land managed by two different ministries).
Competition in China exists both vertically and horizontally. The kind of horizontal competition
described earlier at ministry level extends downwards to all levels of government46. Governments at
different vertical levels could also become competitors. Provincial governments can reserve buildable
land from their quota before distributing it downwards, to create provincial level development zones
within municipality boundaries47. The fragmentation of the state can sometimes provide room for market
and civil society actors to create alliances with certain public institutions48. The lack of civil society in
China, and the fact that the state is taking land from the hands of villagers, suggests the alliance is most
likely to be formed between the state and market actors.

IV.

MARKET ACTORS

The main market actors in this space include private or state-owned industries who need land as one of
their inputs (and sometimes receive land at a subsidized price), and real-estate developers who can pay
high leasing fees to develop land for residential or commercial use. Market actors seek profits, now and
in the future, and this is what drives their interest in land. When demand for land exceeds supply, huge
profits can be derived just by holding vacant or unused land long enough. Developers made huge profits
during late 1990s and early 2000s when land prices rose the fastest. Ma49cited several cases where private
industry investors bought land zoned for industrial use at subsidized price and left them undeveloped or
underdeveloped till they were re-zoned for residential or commercial use. The absence of property tax or
other penalties for keeping land idle encourages many developers to deliberately hold land or slow down
construction for larger profits at a later time.
Responding to developers’ speculative behavior, more regulations are imposed by state and local
governments. The Ministry of Land (MLR) in 2011 announced that land unutilized for a year will incur a
penalty of 20% of the price, and the government may reclaim the unused land without compensation, if it
is kept idle for over two years. Despite these directives, speculators have found ways to hoard land
without making huge investments. One developer we interviewed in 2013 built tennis courts on a land it
44
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had acquired, thus holding the land with minimal investments for a more profitable development later.
Generally, only bigger developers with more financial resources can afford to hold land50.
As mentioned earlier, the fragmentation of local government creates space for market or civil society
actors to form coalitions with public sectors. Local governments have strong interest in promoting real
estate development since it contributes greatly to the local economic growth and they often adopt
entrepreneurial governance strategies, and develop symbiotic relationships with developers.51 They
provide regulatory and tax incentives or market access in exchange for corporate support - sometimes this
takes the form of direct payoffs, at other times, more subtle backing of state projects and priorities.
Developers want cheap land while local governments want to raise revenues and GDP growth. Their land
development interests are thus intertwined, and the process favors developers having good ‘guanxi’52 with
local government.
Local governments and developers have continued to negotiate over how to divide the gains from land
value appreciation among themselves. It is a common practice for the local government to impose extra
conditions for a relatively ‘cheap’ land transaction deal to be approved53. Some of these might allow the
public to capture a bigger share of land value appreciation. However, the opaque nature of government
decisions and the uncertainty they bring to the development process, tend to become grounds for
complaint for developers in land transactions.
When development within an urban area is highly regulated, there is a spillover effect in land markets in
surrounding peri-urban areas that are less regulated and have higher potential for land value appreciation.
In China, rural land that has yet to be converted officially fills the gap. Developers rent or buy the landuse rights from village collectives or villagers directly without it being first expropriated by the state - a
process that is deemed “illegal” by the state.. By offering higher compensation to villagers than that
offered by the local authorities, developers sometimes form coalitions with the village collectives54.
Market forces encourage developers to acquire land illegally. Negotiation strategies between developers
and villagers in these informal land conversions vary according to circumstances. Developers usually
seek support from village leaders, who have a personal interest in attracting investment for the village and
usually facilitate such negotiations or even serve as go-betweens for developers and villagers. They
normally negotiate with each individual villager separately55. The widespread informal developments in
these peri-urban fringes have meant that many villagers become developers themselves with very little
planning guidance. This phenomenon points to the need for land management at a larger regional level,
regulating where to build, and also where not to build.
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V.

CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS

China’s collective land ownership in rural areas gives villagers and village collectives a greater say in the
process of rural-to-urban land conversion than their urban counterparts have. Urban residents can only
indirectly create demand by buying up new urban development projects.
Every rural household in China is entitled to use two forms of land: arable land for agricultural production
(gen di), and residential land for housing construction (zhaiji di). Villagers have the right to farm the
former and use the latter for their own living or rent or sub-contract both to other members from the same
village. No one can sell, lease or rent the land to anyone outside their village, or use the land as security
for obtaining bank loans. The collective ownership requires the land conversion decision to be made at
the village collective’s level. In the absence of formal land markets in rural areas, villagers have
responded to the demand for land for urban expansion, sometime formally (by giving their land to urban
local authorities and accepting compensation), and sometimes informally (dealing directly with
developers and other market actors).

a. Village collectives
The power of the village collective, represented by its elected leader, has mainly been exercised through
the redistribution of land among the rural households, the collection of agricultural taxes (which ended in
2006), and the administration of irrigation facilities. The relationship between village leaders and
villagers is one of cooperation and conflict. Village leaders may want to provide favors to their relatives,
voters and friends. However, being elected officials require them to behave in a relatively ‘reasonable’
manner in order to maintain a certain degree of authority in the village. At the same time, village leaders
have to be accountable to township officials since their performance is evaluated by township officials
which is further linked to their salaries and bonus paid by village collectives56. In the case of compulsory
land acquisition, as long as the upper level government has made a decision, there is little village
collectives or villagers can do to change it. In most cases, the village leaders’ role is limited to conveying
official government notices to villagers, and 'assisting' the township government to 'persuade' villagers to
defer to its decisions.
The impact of land conversion on village households is significant. Villagers either lose their farmland, or
lose all their land (both farm and residential) and are forced to relocate. Monetary compensation is the
only economic gain that individual households can expect. In this situation, village leaders have
considerable discretion over the distribution of the compensation received from the local government (or
developers in the case of informal land transfers). Whether the compensation goes to individual villagers,
or is kept at village level, is often decided by the village committee. In general, the strategy to distribute
compensation and reallocate land use rights follows egalitarian principles to avoid conflict57. The
distribution strategy in cases of land conversion varies depending on the type of land (reserve land,
farmland or residential land) or the scale of the conversion (partial or whole village)58,.
If the land conversion involves only village reserve land, the village collective could decide to keep all
compensation, or distributing it among all the villagers, or a combination of both. In cases when only a
part of the village land is under high conversion pressure, only villagers whose allotted land is affected
56

See reference 15, (Ma, 2009), page 69-73.
Tan, S. H., N. Heerink, & F. T. Qu. (2006). Land fragmentation and its driving forces in China. Land Use
Policy, 23(3), 272-285. doi: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2004.12.001.
58
Li, Ping and Xiaobai Xu. (2004). Land Acquisition Reforms: Field Surveys and Recommendations. China Rural
Observations, volume 6. (in Chinese) [李平、徐孝白：征地制度改革：实地调查与改革建议.《中国农村观
察》2004年第6期]
57

11

usually receive compensation. Other villagers could expect a higher level of compensation in the future
since the compensation amount only goes up as time passes. In cases where farmland compensation
seems to be mostly a one-time payment, for example, when a high speed rail project is passing through a
village, a village level redistribution of compensation and remaining farmland among all village members
would more likely occur. In cases where the whole of the village’s land is converted and villagers
become urbanites, the most important connection between village leaders and farmers will no longer
exist, and the power of village leaders over villagers will soon disappear. In such cases, land conversion is
often seen by village leaders as a last opportunity to seek large personal benefits for themselves59.

b. Villagers
Villagers vary in their interest in land conversion based on their age and their connection to the land. To
younger generation villagers who have worked in cities as migrants for many years, compensation is the
only concern. For the older age groups, resettlement totally changes their livelihood and way of life.
Although the standard compensation for land expropriation is only a tiny fraction of the perceived market
value, it is still a substantial amount for rural households who have been living on farming. Villagers
generally comply with the state’s land conversion decisions. Their compliance around land acquisition is
partly due to the Chinese tendency to defer to government, and to a perception that it is futile to resist the
state60. Villagers might feel dissatisfied with their compensation at times, and might attempt to negotiate
the terms of compensation or resettlement. Some projects may directly offer higher compensation to
expedite the land acquisition process. Most often, villagers attempt to negotiate. Those villagers with no
alternative ways of making a living see land conversion as their last opportunity to exchange their land for
money, and usually expect higher compensation61. There are in general three negotiation strategies. First,
villagers may choose to make up or hide information. For example, they may quickly plant more trees on
their land when compensation is paid according to the number of existing trees. Sometimes these actions
might gain support from village collectives, or even local governments, depending on who provides the
compensation. Second, a villager may refuse to move while others in the village agree to the terms set by
the local authority. They then become what is commonly referred to as 'nail households'62. At any point in
the negotiation process, the local government might choose simply to give up. If a whole village
negotiates for higher compensation and refuses to move, it could lead to the leapfrog pattern of urban
development, in which villages become surrounded by more developed areas. Third, dissatisfied villagers
may choose to protest. Villagers resort to disruptive protests, sometimes leading to violence, after they
have exhausted all lawful procedures63 to fight eviction.
In response to villagers’ negotiation strategies, local governments might choose to compromise by
offering villagers better compensation, including things like social security, medical care and free
education for children, so that villagers are more likely to comply. In other cases, local governments
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might choose to enforce their power64. In recent years, increasing numbers of violent incidents have
happened in China’s western regions where the land market is less formalized and development pressures
are rising. This pressure can cause social stress, confrontation and disorder around crack-downs65,
unpleasant for all and a most painful experience for the villagers involved66. To villagers, local
governments are responsible;67 county and municipal governments were mostly blamed mostly for
compulsory land acquisition, while township authorities and village leaders were blamed for disputes
related to farmland lease rights.
Other than negotiating for compensation money, villagers are also actively involved in capturing the land
value appreciation. In large city suburban areas where land demand is high, two significant development
patterns have been widely reported. The first is the creation of Chengzhongcun (Village in cities), due to
the large scale of farmland acquisition and delays in acquiring rural residential land (due to high
relocation cost involved). In these situations, villagers who have lost their farmland become surrounded
by urban land. They respond to the increasing rental housing demand from the city by building multistoried apartments on their allotted residential land, and renting rooms to households (mostly migrants)68.
With sub-standard planning and construction, this housing provides an affordable option for migrant
workers affordable housing69 in China’s cities. 70 As land prices keep rising around these settlements, the
Chengzhongcun will sooner or later be redeveloped, as has been documented in recent studies71.
The second phenomenon is the creation of small property housing. Responding to developers’ search for
less regulated land, villagers recognize a new option for their collectively owned land: to rent informally
to developers with compensation higher than the official standard. The informal transfers of land use
rights through rental between villagers and developers are mutually beneficial72, although 'informal and
illegal' in the eyes of the state. Developers typically are capable of obtaining 'implied' permission from
local governments to carry out informal conversion. Attracted by huge potential profits, villagers opt to
work with developers, or on their own, and ignore state regulations, building housing catering to urban
homebuyers who could not afford commercial housing with full property rights. Unofficial but widely
accepted estimates suggest that at least 6 billion square meters of 'small property rights' housing were
constructed in China by 2010, accounting for more than 20 percent of the nation’s total constructed urban
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area73. If this number is correct, small property rights housing has certainly contributed in a major way to
urban sprawl, informally converting this sizable percentage of rural land for urban use without planning
considerations. As long as there is a market demand for cheaper housing, villagers in peri-urban areas and
developers will continue to risk participating in this informal development. Although the state denounces
this 'small property rights' development, in reality, because of concerns over social stability, this kind of
development has rarely been punished.
We have elaborated how during China’s urbanization processes the local state, driven by economic
growth, is acquiring and leasing out more land to generate public revenue; how market actors are
speculating, and hoarding more land for higher profits; and how villagers are motivated by compensation
and capture of land value appreciation on their own. All of them are ignoring the national level policy of
farmland protection. All are motivated by the economic benefit of land conversion, and less concerned
about the environmental or social impact of development. The major actors in China’s land conversion
processes, in other words, are all pro-growth, and stand to benefit from urban sprawl. Although wellintentioned, the national government's weak vertical supervision has meant that land protection policies
are not enforced.

VI.

DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

When all actors involved in the land conversion process are motivated by economic growth, and national
level land protection policies are not enforced, it calls into question whether regional or local level urban
planning can manage growth to an environmentally sustainable level. However, if we explore the role of
planning in China’s urban development processes, we find that the planning institutions that manage
urban growth are part of the local government body. In theory, these planning institutions should be
mediators, trying to balance the interests of different groups that are in constant development tension and
conflict with each other. In most countries, these tensions are manifested in partisan political competition,
with a broad and independent civil society confronting state and market interests 74. In China, growth has
become an imperative for governance, and planning is therefore pro-growth75, rather than enemy of
business as it is in the West. Planners help to justify the government's economic growth ambitions and its
legitimacy, and to internalize the economic growth model. Chinese planners work on the “...mere
rationalization of political decisions”76. It is difficult for the local planner to present technical evidence
against the decisions of the local government77. Moreover, Chinese planners at the local level are mostly
physical planners, trained in architecture schools, and have very little training in economics, politics,
social or environmental sciences. They generally lack the expertise to inform public decision-making
from a multidisciplinary perspective. Planners’ rational decision making is influenced by their own
embedded interests in urban development, of which they too are beneficiaries, obtaining such personal
favours as gifts, bribes and paid travel in exchange for other resources..
Chinese cities certainly pose unique planning challenges, given their dramatic growth: the large flow of
rural surplus labor moving to cities looking for opportunities, and a concomitant state promotion of
migration from rural to urban areas make it hard, if not impossible, to predict a cities’ population
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growth78. Larger and more economically developed cities in China tend to use vague population
projection numbers to justify their urban sprawl. Although the inclusion of more land in the city helps to
keep land value and housing costs affordable, the rate of urban land growth in China is much faster than
the rate of urban population growth, especially in larger cities. This has led to a situation where
population density in large Chinese cities is much lower than in other world cities of similar size79.
Our paper has adopted a “political ecology” framework to analyze the main stakeholders involved in the
land conversion games in the rapidly urbanizing cities, and to draw a relatively comprehensive picture of
China’s urban sprawl. We specifically focus on three sets of actors and institutions: state actors (national
and local government), market actors (industrial entrepreneurs and real estate developers) and civil
society actors (villagers and village collectives). Our main findings are the following:
1. National government actors have established multiple conflicting development goals. These
conflicting goals lead local governments to understand that economic growth is the main
factor on which they are evaluated in the politically centralized system. The limited local
government revenues, their inability to levy their own taxes, and the weak vertical
supervision from the top provide plenty of room for local governments to pursue economic
growth through land and infrastructure development. The government fragmentation allows
for coalitions to form between local government and enterprises, and these drive GDP growth
and urban sprawl.
2. Without sufficient disincentives (fiscal or regulatory) against holding land or housing vacant
or underutilized, market actors are encouraged to speculate on land for future profits; the
local development coalitions promote further land conversion and breed corruption; and the
uneven development of land markets pushes developers to seek less regulated rural land, and
to encourage informal development.
3. Villagers are generally attracted to land conversion by the “windfall” compensation, which is
high in comparison to their farming income. They oppose land conversion only when
compensation for the disruption of their livelihood is inadequate. Their desire to focus their
negotiations on the level of compensation not only gives room for developers to offer higher
compensation to acquire land, but also encourages villagers to engage in land speculation
themselves.
4. Although planners are generally supposed to control development, planners in China end up
having to justify development decisions already made by local or provincial officials.
Planning education in China emphasizes physical planning and includes very little training in
other disciplines that also affect plans. Planners are unable to offer independent opinions on
public decisions on land development, based on expert knowledge. They also have embedded
interests in the urban development processes, gaining more tangible benefits when they serve
the interests of the officials.
As a whole, it is safe for us to conclude that the key actors involved in land conversion in Chinese cities
have a vested interest in urban expansion and growth. This has led to urban sprawl at an unprecedented
speed, in both formal and informal ways. Urban growth turns out to be a land grab competition among the
state, market and civil society actors in China. Local governments want to generate more revenue to fulfill
their responsibilities; market actors want to make more profit through land holding and development
projects; and villagers want to obtain higher compensation for their land. Those who are supposed to stay
78
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neutral in these land conversion games, the planners, also benefit from development. They often use their
technical skills to justify decisions already made by officials instead of bringing independent voices of
reason into the development decisions.
Experiences from other growth control practices suggest that development coordination should happen at
regional level to prevent urban sprawl80. An independent land court, a regional level elected government,
and broad and independent civil society together create the institutions for checks and balances in land
development. A sustainable urban growth system requires pro-growth efforts to be balanced by certain
anti-growth forces. Evidently, China’s urban development lacks this opposition. The anti-growth forces
in the western countries originated either in individual communities that want to maintain their quality of
life and resist change; or in top-down state level legislation rooted in environmental concern over the fast
disappearance of rural land81 or in a combination of both. Our analysis has revealed that these forces have
yet to evolve in China. The rural population (particularly the young) are attracted to urban living and the
prospect of economically benefiting from their land. The farmland protection policy remains a state level
legislation and was not implemented and reinforced at the local level because it conflicts with economic
development.
The land conversion process, with mostly pro-growth actors in China, suggests weaknesses in the
institutional settings. The behaviour of different actors is in reality a 'rational choice' to maximize
individual gains by taking advantage of institutional shortfalls. Informal structures of power and practice
in China’s political economy context render the formal farmland protection policy ineffective.
Responding to the findings from our analysis, we support the development of the following set of
policies,
1. Fiscal devolution – A higher share of local revenues should return to local governments,
and/or local governments should be allowed to levy their own tax, and to revise cadre
evaluation criteria away from single GDP factors.
2. Land markets should be increasingly formalized to prevent market actors’ informal and
illegal land conversion;
3. Rural land markets should be created and farmers' legal control strengthened over the land
they use. This could effectively balance the local government expropriation of rural land, and
establish real market value for land transfer.
4. A set of disincentives should be institutionalized for those who speculate on real estate, either
letting local authorities levy property tax or penalizing those who leave land or housing
vacant or underutilized.
The successful improvement of the land conversion system hinges on the willingness and capacity of the
national government to reform existing political and economic institutions. These discussions are
currently on the table, including the modification of the cadre evaluation system82, and a series of
experiments on rural land reform83. These policy changes are all in the pilot stage and may take long time
to be effective.
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